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Abstract
How Does Participatory Budgeting Affect Council Member Priorities?
There is a growing literature concerning participatory budgeting (PB), which transfers some element of
budgetary decision making from the executive or legislature to the citizens. It is widely held that this
practice originated in Porto Alegre, Brazil in 1989, although there is evidence of antecedents from the
1970s and 1980s and co-developments elsewhere in Brazil (Goldfrank, 2007; Souza, 2001). During the
earlier years of development, this practice was found primarily in less developed countries. Early PB
reoriented government expenditures to better focus on the needs of the populace. Substantial shares of
the budget (9.8-21%) were allocated through participatory process (Souza, 2001).
The first documented instance of PB in North America is in Guelph, Canada beginning in 1999
(Pinnington, Lerner, & Schugurensky, 2009). The first United States municipality to adopt PB was
Chicago in 2009 (Stewart, Miller, Hildreth, & Wright-Phillips, 2014). New York City adopted a version of
participatory budgeting with a process occurring in 2011-2012 with budgetary decisions for Fiscal Year
2013 (Lerner & Secondo, 2012; New York City Council, [2015]; Stewart et al., 2014). Initially four city
council members committed a portion of their member selected discretionary capital projects to
participatory budgeting, for a total of $6 million. Over the years the number of council members has
increased; in the 2016-17 cycle, 31 council members contributed $40 million of their discretionary
capital spending. As of September 2017, the City Council website shows 31 council members
participating in the 2017-18 process (New York City Council, 2017c, 2017d).
Discretionary spending refers to what is more commonly known as earmarks. In New York City,
earmarks are in two large groups, one for the expenditure budget and the other for capital budget. The
New York City variant of PB is only associated with the capital budget. The $40 million is less than 1% of
the capital budget and, in fact, is a relatively small share of the member directed capital spending. Data
on member item capital spending is available from 2002 through the most recent budget decision
period. For this study, data has been collected through FY 2017. The data are aggregated into eight
categories: education, parks and recreation, arts, culture and communities, transit, housing, public
safety, seniors, and all other.
The data availability across these years suggests a natural experiment: PB allows citizens to select
projects. However, council members contribute only part of their capital discretionary funds to PB.
While citizens may select specific projects, council members may balance their overall allocations by
adjusting priorities within the discretion they retain. If there is actual impact on priorities, there should
be some shift in the funding among the eight categories. If there is no substantial shift, then that
suggests that the council members are using their remaining discretion to maintain their aggregate
priority preferences.
This study uses time series of allocations of participating and nonparticipating members to determine
whether allocation changes differ between the two groups.
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Introduction
Participatory Budgeting (“PB”) has spread to more than 3000 cities (Su, 2017). It is
popular among reformers, subnational governments, and academics. Wampler (2012) describes
PB as a “Rorschach test” allowing for emphasizing the role of PB as a process that empowers
citizens and enhances democracy and well-being, or as a way for governments to legitimize
themselves by co-opting activists pushing for more democratization. Accordingly, what goes
under the title PB can take numerous forms, and as such Ganuza and Baiocchi (2012, p. 1) note
that “To speak of Participatory Budgeting today is to speak of a seemingly infinitely malleable
set of institutions.”
In this paper, we examine whether PB refocuses public capital spending through increased
public engagement an reflects genuine transfer of significant decision-making power from
officials to the residents or is, instead, a superficial process that coopts residents, deflecting
their desire for budgetary influence through symbolic decision making. In the next section
define participatory budgeting.
Characteristics of Participatory Budgeting Institutions
Broadly speaking, the essential characteristic of PB is a process that “allows the
participation of non-elected citizens in the conception and/or allocation of public finances”
(Sintomer, Herzberg, & Röcke, 2008, p. 168), In principle, it is open for every citizen or resident
to vote for specific projects, which will then be implemented by governments, and which often
include a value-based component emphasizing social justice (Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012).
Shah (2007, p. 1) defines PB as a “direct-democracy approach to budgeting” that has the
2

benefits of (1) educating, and engaging citizens on the processes of governance; (2) improving
delivery of services by increasing transparency, accountability, and efficiency while also tackling
corruption and clientelism; and (3) providing opportunity for marginalized groups to
participate; all together potentially increasing responsiveness and accountability of
governments to their citizens, carrying the promise to “improve government performance and
enhance the quality of democratic participation” (2007, p. 1).
Wampler and Hartz-Karp (2012) discuss challenges arising from the differences in goals of
PB. They find that there is a conflict between the focus on deliberation and the aim for such
substantive results as more equitable distribution of governmental resources.
Ganuza and Baiocchi (2012, pp. 1–2) argue the model of PB that originated I Brazil in the
early 1990s and spread across Brazil and Latin America was “a set of comprehensive
administrative reforms… that seemed to render compatible social justice, good governance,
and electoral fortunes for the left … [but the model that spread globally late 1990s and later
became] a politically neutral device, one that could improve governance and generate trust in
government.” In the next sections, we examine PB in several contexts leading to a theory pf the
role of participatory budgeting.
Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil
Cabannes (2004) divides the history of PB into three phases, starting with
experimentation Porto Alegre Brazil, and Latin American cities roughly during the 1990s, and
afterwards spreading more widely in Brazil in the late 1990s, and then beyond Brazil to Latin
America, Europe, and beyond, with various modifications.
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Wampler (2012) observes that PB is often implemented in politically advantageous
moments where there is a combination of political will from elected office holders and civil
society actors, both of whom share aims of affecting changes in the way politics are conducted.
The birth of PB took place during the democratization of Latin America, in the 1980s and 90s
where the increasingly powerful Workers Party in Brazil joined forces with movements
demanding democratic reforms and improved services in an alliance between emerging
political forces that contributed to the ambitious scope of reforms in Porto Alegre (Goldfrank,
2007).
In Porto Alegre, the process included:
•

A quality of life index that guided resources to low-income communities;

•

A track that accommodated civic movements organized around themes rather of
regions

Both of these explicitly changed the rules of conduct and goals of politics (Wampler, 2012, p. 2).
Porto Alegre also centralized administration, consequently PB became a way to include inputs
from the public (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012).
Other notable features included in the Porto Alegre PB included the “hallmark”
openness for anyone to participate in principle. This was novel, but not without friction as
associations saw their influence as intermediaries reduced (Baiocchi, 2001). Politicians were
sidelined, which reduced cronyism (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012). A Municipal Council of the
Budget was created to discuss and legitimize the rules. This council included representatives
from the various parts of the process. It gives participants the power regulate how they
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interacted with the government (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014). Administrative reforms were
accompanied by increases in taxes together with reforms to reduce fraud and evasion, which
lead to doubling Porto Alegre’s revenues (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012). In short, the reforms in
Porto Alegre were substantial in nature and scope.
Baiocchi and Ganuza (2014) find that the combination of accommodating democratic
decision making and substantive outcomes, are what make PB significant. A World Bank et al.
(2008) report found that PB in Porto Alegre achieved the democratic inclusiveness by including
women, low-income populations, minorities, and people with disabilities.
The early substantive outcome was that the municipal adoption of PB is associated with
increased spending on basic sanitation and health care, and a reduction in infant mortality rates
Gonçalves (2014). PB in Porto Alegre is associated with redistributive effect because projects
were directed more proportionately to poor areas. Substantial shares of the budget (9.8-21% of the
total budget) were allocated through participatory process (Souza, 2001) An observed effect was that

the public works raised the value of land in the poor areas (Marquetti, Schonewald Da Silva, &
Campbell, 2012). Although PB in Porto Alegre did not reach the extremely poor people, the
process was an improvement compared to the prior clientelist system where communities
received projects as political rewards (Souza, 2001). Boulding and Wampler (2010) analyze data
from 220 Brazilian cities and observe that PB is associated with increased spending on
healthcare and small decreases in poverty, but caution that PB will have limited impact on
social justice when combined with only limited resources.
Global Experiences in PB
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PB spread across Brazil through the networks of the Worker’s Party, extended across
Latin America through political networks and promoted by civil society, and finally spreading
across the globe in the 2000s after international organizations, development agencies and
activists were introduced to the model in the 2005 World Social Forum (Baiocchi & Ganuza,
2014).
Thus, in addition to the pull-factors of the inspiring example provided by the Porto
Alegre-model of PB, there are push factors behind the global spread of PB, as international
development agencies, such as World Bank, UN Habitat, and agencies of individual countries
such as the USAID adopted a pro-PB stance (Goldfrank, 2007). The World Bank, for example,
has supported programs promoting PB and provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support
of PB in at least 15 countries (Goldfrank, 2012).
However, the World Bank version of PB is criticized as it lacks social justice components.
This value neutrality may have contributed to the global spread because it is politically
acceptable to potential opponents (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012). Baiocchi and Ganuza (2014)
conclude the empowerment dimension has not been associated with widely adopted PB
because it is more challenging to achieve.
Regardless of the initial motivations, and eventual results, the global spread has been
accompanied by ambiguity in the purposes and characteristics of PB (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012).
The ambiguity carries the risk of PB becoming a superficial project with weak links to decision
making and small budgets with rigid rules for spending (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014) in contrast
with the Porto Alegre PB, where citizens not only participated, but had power to define the

6

terms of their participation. This weaker version may reflect symbolic democratization that
coopts, rather than empowers, participants.
Participatory Budgeting in Europe
Sintomer et al. (2008) divide the PB processes in Europe into those with robust
mechanisms for wider citizen engagement combined with active civil society engagement,
contrasted with the ones where the process was merely superficial. Only the former ones
produce such results as (1) calls for transparency regarding public budgets and specific projects,
and (2) improved administrative efficiency and responsiveness towards the citizens. Röcke
(2014) identifies key components of successful PB processes as: the willingness of political
leadership to develop new mechanisms for participation, administrative and financial support,
and support for the initiative among officials that have approve the projects. She describes PB
in Europe as raising hopes in the early 2000s, while ultimately producing underwhelming
results. Baiocchi and Ganuza (2014) find that some processes included direct decision making,
while others were merely consultations; most were open to all in principle, some used lottery
to select participants, and some included organized groups as opposed to citizens; and that
usually PB is just one tool to link the local governments to citizens, causing frictions with other
processes.
Allegretti and Herzberg (2004) find that PB in Germany in the early 2000s decisions were
made by city councils with only selective regard for citizen input. This process is characterized
by asymmetrical power relations between city councils and the citizens, lack of transparency,
and superficiality of information. PB in Germany was not intended to be redistributive, but was
a way to modernize governance and make it more open, and as such German PB is typically
7

consultative in nature (Ruesch & Wagner, 2014). The challenges German PB has faced include
declining participation and a lack of representativeness.
Observations elsewhere in Europe reflect evolving PB practices. In Italy, PB processes
are differentiated by the extent power is devolved and the challenge of distinguishing between
processes that were advisory, and those that actually empowered the participants to make
decisions (Bassoli, 2012). With Portuguese experiences with PB, Alves and Allegretti (2012)
distinguish between “first generation” PB that was ideological and consultative, and “second
generation” PB which was characterized by shared decision-making powers.
Participatory Budgeting in North America
The first documented instance of PB in North America is in Guelph, Canada beginning in 1999
(Pinnington et al., 2009). The Guelph project uses deliberative processes to allocate unrestricted grant
funding that is partly awarded from the municipal government. The first United States municipality to
adopt PB was Chicago in 2009 (Stewart et al., 2014). Alderman Joe Moore of Chicago’s 40th Ward

volunteered to devote $1.3 Million of his discretionary budget to the PB (Lerner & Secondo,
2012). While PB in the 49th Ward has shifted spending patterns by including projects, such as
murals and community gardens, it has faced critique by failing to include significant proportion
of citizens, and minorities, and of its’ rigid rules set by the alderman’s staff which deprived the
participants of the power to define the contours of their participation (Stewart et al., 2014).
Thus, PB in Chicago, though still expanding has lacked the empowerment dimension (Pin, 2017).
PB in Chicago did succeed in setting a precedent and an example for further adaptations in the
United States. Hagelskamp, Rinehart, Silliman, and Schleifer (2016) show 13 North American
cities (with 46 districts) engaged in participatory budgeting in the 2014-2015 decision (voting)
8

year. This appears to be an undercount as it is fairly easy to find communities not included in
this report that have engaged in the process during that year ("Greensboro Participatory
Budgeting Handbook 2015 - 2016," 2015; Tariq & Fletcher, 2016). While no firm count exists
from a single reliable source, Public Agenda, an organization that promotes participatory
budgeting, continues to show dispersion to communities not reported in earlier years as of late
2017 ("Participatory Budgeting," 2017). Where discernable from these reports, the common
approach involves council members who allocate part or all of a discretionary budget allowance
to citizen or resident decision making.
A Theory of Participatory Budgeting
Early PB developed in three significant dimensions as shown in Figure 1:
•

It expanded the access to budget decision making by engaging a broad array of
citizens or residents, and

•

It provided these participants control over a significant share of the resources.

•

It reallocated funds from purposes preferred by elites and experts, to those
preferred by the newly empowered population.

The effect of this redirection has been to provide more equitable access to
governmentally funded projects. Figure 1 shows that each of these dimensions can be
understood as a continuum from minimal engagement to transformative change.
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Figure 1 Dimensions of Participatory Budgeting
b. Direct Democracy
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c. Trivial Amounts
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More Change

A

a. Consultation
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a. Consultation
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D

f
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The first dimension, labeled a - b in Figure 1D, ranges from consultation to direct
democracy. In the consultative form, the engaged residents may select projects and
expenditure plans, but these are treated as recommendations to more traditional political
actors, elected officials and governmental experts. At the opposite end of the continuum,
through direct democracy, the PB selections are thereby decided. The role of elected officials
and government officials is to effectuate these decisions. The range of this continuum may
reflect the degree to which the governmental participants can influence or veto decisions made
by the public. This control may be subtle, through such devices and rejecting projects and not
fundable as a capital project or through the estimation of the cost of the project. Alternatively,
it may be overt, through a role in formal decision making.
The second dimension, labeled c - d in Figure 1D, involves the amount of resources
affected by decisions or recommendations made through the participatory process. In early
Porto Alegre experience, the share of the expenditures was substantial, as much as 21%,
although it varied widely for reported years. On the other hand, some literature shows that in
more developed countries, the share may be much smaller, reflecting the discretionary funds
controlled by a single legislator. More significant decisions in this dimension reflect larger
shares of resources.
The third dimension, labeled e - f in Figure 1D, reflects the degree by which resources
are redirected. More significant redirection of resources involves changing the purpose for
which public resources are spent and the beneficiaries of resources. The early program
redirected resources to basic needs in neglected communities, that is, the use of this money is
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reported to redirect both purpose and beneficiaries of funds. More minimal redirection may
involve selection of projects without power to shift the purpose or beneficiaries of funding.
As shown in Figure 1, we label direct democracy affecting substantial resources and
substantial redirection (reallocation) as full PB, while consultation with less significant resources
and minimal redirection is labeled symbolic PB.
Overview of Participatory Budgeting In New York City
New York has had a citizen budget participation process for many years. This process
involves the community boards, which have, as one of their functions, an annual budget
request. The predecessor of the current community boards were community district planning
boards or community planning boards, first established by the Manhattan Borough President in
1951 and expanded to all five boroughs in 1963 (Kihss, 1963). In the 1975 New York City Charter
revisions, these became 59 community boards and their associated community districts
(Pecorella, 1989). Unlike the 51 city council districts, the community districts have fixed
boarders. In the 2010 Census, their populations ranged from 51,000 to 241,000, with an
average of 139,000 ("New York City Population By Community Districts," [2017]). Community
boards are appointed by borough presidents in consultation with council members
Robert Pecorella (1986, 1988, 1989, 1994) provides a mixed but somewhat upbeat
analysis of community board budgeting. He does suggest that upper income white
neighborhoods are more successful than other communities in obtaining their capital budgets.
His reported data actually shows relatively poor performance for communities in general. While
Pecorella says the data for the later period shows better performance than the earlier period,
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most of his data shows limited success and much of the success achieved appears to depend on
agency co-sponsorship; it is not clear who is the actual primary requestor and who the
cosponsor. Pecorella points out that the 1989 charter revision weakened the community board
role indirectly when it eliminated the Board of Estimate, because the borough presidents, who
had appointed members to the Board of Estimate, lost a substantial role in the budget process.
In fact, the current charter does not contain some of the strongest language in support of
community board budgeting that Pecorella found in the 1975 charter revisions ("New York City
Charter As Amended Through July 2004," 2004; Pecorella, 1994, pp. 151-152).
The community boards’ budget activities include consultation with city agencies,
development of “Statement of Community District Needs” that is submitted to the city and
published by the Department of Planning, preparation of a budget request that includes an
expense budget items and an capital budget items, conducting public hearings, and submitting
ae budget request to the city ("Handbook for Community Board Members," 2014; "New York
City Charter As Amended Through July 2004," 2004, §§ 230 - 231). Several of these activities
were explicitly required in the 1975 charter (Pecorella, 1994), but can no longer be found ("New
York City Charter As Amended Through July 2004," 2004). The capital and expense budgets are
collected together for all community boards in a massive document labeled the budget register.
A review of any recent budget register shows that the community boards are not always clear
as to what counts as a capital versus expense budget item ("Register of Community Board
Budget Requests For The Executive Budget Fiscal Year 2018," 2017). It also shows a curious
tendency for the same or similar requests to recur throughout the register; for example, the
cited register requests funding for fire departments to provide smoke detectors eight times.
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This phenomenon results from the consultation process, which provides an opportunity for the
agencies to lobby the representatives of the community boards to include their agency needs
within the community board budget requests. 1 By organizing these consultations in this format,
the city’s Office of Management and Budget assists agencies in obtaining supplemental funding
through community board processes rather than assisting community boards to obtain
meaningful information that would assist them in developing meaningful requests associated
with their local community needs. Considering this relatively weak performance of community
board budgeting, the advent of participatory budgeting, a replacement process, is not
surprising.
PB in New York City (PBNYC) was initiated by four city council members in the fall of
2011 in planning for FY 2013. Each participating council member set aside a $1 million of their
discretionary capital project funds (Gilman, 2016). Council member participation in PB has since
expanded; in the 2016-17 cycle 31 of 51 members committed a total of $40 million (New York
City Council, 2017b).
One of the initial participants, Melissa Mark-Viverito, became the Speaker (chairperson)
of the New York City Council in 2014, and this political factor likely contributed to the expansion
of PBNYC. Before her ascendancy, the PB process was coordinated through a cooperative
agreement between civil society organizations and the participating council members, which
created a citywide steering committee. The steering committee membership included city
council staff and civil society organizations. It had managed the rules and resources for the

1

An author of this paper participated in this process for several years between 2007 and 2009 as the chair of the
budget committee of a Manhattan community board.
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process. This arrangement extended ownership of the process beyond elected officials (JabolaCarolus, 2017).
After the election of new speaker, the council devoted more staff and resources to
citywide coordination and support of PB, which had two effects: increasing resources for
coordination, but also replacing civil society participation with city government staff. PB
expanded to more districts and used new tools to support outreach, monitoring efforts, and
overall efficiency and institutionalization of the process. However, popular control and of the
steering committee was reduced and its role became ambiguous (Jabola-Carolus, 2017).
Gilman (2016) finds that many of the more than 40 original organizations participating in the
steering committee dropped out as the council took more direct control.
With respect to concrete outcomes, Gilman (2016) labels about 40% of the pilot year
PBNYC projects innovative and illustrative of the way communities can identify need potentially
more effectively than the conventional process, while the rest were projects that corresponded
to conventional types of capital spending. PBNYC is credited as not being “a watered down,
good governance exercise in the name of social justice” (Su, 2017, p. 7); however, the relatively
small share of the city’s capital budget committed to PB reduces redistribution in behalf of
equity (Su, 2017). As such, it is unclear is PBNYC can escape being labelled ambiguous and
superficial.
Empirical Expectations
The various literature including the official New York City participatory budgeting
website suggests that the decision making is relatively strong in that the council members have
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submitted the projects selected in the PB process as part of their discretionary budget proposal
(New York City Council, 2017e). This may be undermined somewhat because the city agencies
prepare cost estimates of the projects and determine whether they eligible for capital funding.
A somewhat less limiting element is the fact that the decision process, while reportedly fully
honored by the actual council members, is subject to several stages of formal decision making
by city council and the mayor. Thus, on the a – b dimension, the decision is closer to high
influence of direct democracy, but cannot be found near the fully direct democracy end.
New York City’s 2018 capital appropriation is $37 billion (New York City, 2017). The
commitment of $40 million to participatory budgeting is 0.1% of this amount and is a relatively
small 16% of the council member discretionary capital spending 2 (New York City Council,
2017a). Therefore, the program can be found near the left end (trivial amounts) of the c – d
dimension and has very low impact.
The council members reserve al large portion of their capital discretionary budget (both
individually and collectively) for their own selection. The members typically commit $1 million
to PB (New York City Council, 2017e), while in the most recent year, they were able to allocate
$5 million to discretionary capital expenditures (New York City Council, 2017a), thus, they held
back $4 million. This provides the members the opportunity to balance their overall
commitment to reflect their own preferences regardless of the programmatic focus selected by
their constituents. If so, the process would reflect the no reallocation (little change) end of the
e – f dimension. This leads to the principle empirical question examined here, to what degree

2

Council member discretionary capital spending is spent in two broad categories. $40 million is 7% of the total or
16% of the portion that is clearly directed by specific council members (New York City Council, 2017a).
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does the PBNYC process lead to reallocation and changed budgetary focus. Change here, refers
to change in focus. The city assigns capital expenditures to 22 different categories. Across all
members, roughly half of the member assigned capital spending going to education and nearly
20% of the remainder going to parks. Six other categories receive more than 2% (New York City
Council, 2017a). For this study, a change in focus refers to a change in proportions of
expenditure assignment between these categories. The primary hypothesis of this study is that
there is no difference in year-to-year changes in proportions of member assigned capital
spending to these categories between members engaged in participatory budgeting and those
not engaged in participatory budgeting. The implication of this hypothesis is that there is no
significant reallocation that is related to participatory budgeting.
While we anticipate no effect of participatory budgeting on reallocation, it is possible
that there are other ways that participatory budgeting affects allocation. In particular, council
members can spread good will to more participatory budgeting engaged constitutes by funding
of multiple small projects rather than a limited number of larger projects. So, a second
hypothesis is that (a) the average size of the member directed capital expenditures will be
smaller for members engaged in participatory budgeting and (b) the number of projects will be
larger.
Data
[Needs to provide data description here, followed by restating of hypotheses reflecting the data
description.]
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